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INTRODUCTION 
Competition and competition policy have been a major issue in Economics. Within the 
theoretical framework of Economics of Regulation, the Government assumes contradictory 
positions, as its role is both to foster domestic industrial potentials and to guarantee a real 
competitive environment. The first directive may lead that the Government prefers to protect 
the domestic industry from competition, especially from abroad, whereas the second directive 
should lead to the elimination of economic barriers to business. 
 
This contradiction is firmly present in the public transport industry, which is used to be firmly 
regulated in the context of monopolized networks designed by the authorities. Of course, it 
must not be overseen that the regulated service networks are submitted to competition by 
substitute services. In casu of public transport, the private car but also up to a certain extent 
the non-motorized transport modes (bike, pedestrian) challenge the monopoly in the public 
transport industry. Within the industry itself competition may rise between different 
transportation technologies (rail, road, water) and between the operators in a specific service 
mode (bus), when the network policy still permits some choice for the traveller, or if the 
service is basically deregulated. 
 
The proper regulation of urban public transport requires that the fundamental characteristics 
of its market are considered. One principal and especially contradictory aspect is that its user 
consumes at the same time a journey, a line service and a line network. As a journey 
consumer, he is mainly interested in an immediate service between his origin and his 
destination. This main consumer interest is best delivered by private transport, hence its 
popularity. But as a captive user of public transport, he will expect a regular and direct service 
between the origin and destination, especially between his home and workplace (or school or 
university, in the case of students). At the same time, for his other activity needs (shopping, 
health care, leisure, etc.) he expects a dense service network. 
 
To supply the huge amount of different users with spatially differentiated and complex needs 
is a big challenge both to operators and to the authorities, which conflict at their turn in their 
role: the operator is basically interested in the fare box return, hence he prefers to operated 
lines with a consolidated market, whereas the authorities are in charge to ensure an overall 
and permanent accessibility, which impedes that all necessary lines and operation periods 
produce positive end results in terms of profit. On the top of all that, the users expect and the 
authorities are made responsible for ensuring that the fare prices are accessible to all users, 
especially to the users with a low income. 
 
The duty of the authorities is even more complex, as it is challenged by the infrastructure 
investment demands of the individual transport, which normally has a strong constituency, as 
it is the transportation modes preferred by the elites and the middle-class. This pressure and 
also the fact that the politicians and higher officials in power more than often belong to these 
social groups may lead to a situation that priority in the transportation policies is not given to 
public transport policy, disregarding of its huge social and environmental role and of its 
importance for maintaining congestion under control.  
 
It may be said that the first challenge for the public administration of public transport is 
simply to put public transport into the main policy agenda. Without this primary step, all the 
efforts taken by the officials in charge for ensuring good and economic networks, a proper 
market and quality policy and other important measures will be frustrated. In the 
consequence, public transport will be regarded as a service mainly for the captive and socially 
distressed users, and it will enjoy little investment or none at all. Abandoned by the key 
decision makers, the officials will be pressured by the politically stronger operators, which 
will seek to capture regulation.  
 
More than frequently, public transport is put into the agenda in cases of heavy congestion, 
which endangers the freedom of circulation of the automobile (here, public transport policy 
arises as a traffic problem), or if heavy investments are foreseen in politically visible public 
works (ribbon-cutting motivation). 
 
In this context, competition policy for the public transport industry arises as a subordinated 
point. When public transport is not in the agenda, the Government tends to avoid any conflict 
in an industry which has not any priority and will not make serious effort to assure its 
competitiveness. When it is in fact in the agenda, the competition approach will depend on the 
strategy adopted for its regulation: even so it may be openly anti-competitive, if the strategy 
aims to reinforce industrial potentials, to adopt more sophisticated technology or simply to 
limit the number of operators to a controllable amount. Often, the officials trend to avoid the 
transaction costs of tendering procedures and to come into friendly terms with “their” 
operators (trust-building approach). If the competitive approach is chosen, straightforward 
deregulation or the organization of competitive tendering procedures are the common 
procedures.  
 
When the authorities remain indifferent to public transport, the regulation may be captured by 
the operators in countries where a robust entrepreneurial organization is in place. In other, 
where the industry is dispersed into a huge amount of small operators, an actual deregulation 
may occur, even if the formal legal system does not foresee it.   
 
There are several special events which challenge substantially the regulatory policy and its 
underlying competition strategy: privatization of governmental assets (bus or rail companies) 
may be introduced to foster competitiveness and efficiency. Elsewhere, when public transport 
is not on the agenda, privatization make be placed in order to shake off its operation from the 
duties of the government. This kind of privatization strategy does not foster competitiveness, 
as a not popular asset is given away at the most favourable conditions (low offer, low 
investment duties for the operator, market protection, etc.) for the overtaking party. More 
recently, technological upgrading at least of the most important corridors has led to an open 
industry concentration strategy (case of Bogotá). Also, when tendering procedures are 
enforced by the Courts, the procedures may be organized in a manner where real competition 
does not take place but formally complies with the Law. 
 
This general framework is the background of this contribution, which analyses the trends of 
the competition in urban transport in South America. This subcontinent is known to show 
clearly two models, one of dispersed artisan production, more present in Hispanic America, 
the other of a robust and concentrated capitalist sector (Brazil). Recently, significant changes 
have been put in place: Hispanic American countries are introducing modern corridors which 
require a more concentrated industry, whereas in Brazil, illegal artisan operators are 
challenging the incumbents and the overprotective regulation. In the next section, the 
principal trends are presented and illustrated by fact material with respect to the different 
countries.    
 
Competition and competition policy in South American public transport 
Road transport is overwhelming dominant in Latin American cities. Car ownership is rising 
overall, while the public transport is dominated by bus. Public policies have given high 
priority to private transportation, producing increasingly congestion and diseconomies. This 
trend began in the fifties and sixties, when former dense tram networks were closed to give 
place to bus, and enormous sums were invested in the road system (Figueroa 2005). 
 
Since then, public transport policies have arisen in South America when traffic conditions 
became worse, deteriorating the overall productivity of the urban economy, or when it gave 
opportunity for major public works (new metro line), or still when social unrest, in general 
linked to the fare prices (bus services) or to unacceptably low service quality (rail services), 
required urgent public action. During the oil crisis, the energy problem led also to some 
investment, mainly by central government. 
 
Where there has been an active public transport policy, the competition strategies have given 
priority to concentration and market protection. When public transport is not considered as a 
priority, the passive position of the Government leads to regulatory capture by major 
operators and their unions (Brazilian case) or to actual deregulation (Hispanic America). 
Major changes occur in the sequence of worsening of congestion, where the introduction of 
new technologies may take place, which imply also in rebuilding the market. Other changes 
are introduced when privatization of public rail operators are organized. 
 
The main trends in Hispano-America 
As advanced before, there are fundamental differences between hispano-american countries 
and Brazil. In this last country, the introduction of automobile manufactures has led to the rise 
of a strong bus manufacturing industry. In the sequence, the local governments have preferred 
to force the concentration of operators, requiring to the operators the acquisition of major bus 
fleets.  
 
As a contrast, in Hipano-america, this policy has not been in place, even if some countries 
had, at least temporally, domestic automobile manufacturing industries (Argentina, Mexico, 
Chile and, albeit in a smaller scale, Venezuela). The public transport market has remained 
dispersed, and a huge amount of operators have practiced open on-the-street competition.  
 
But it can not be said that the situation is homogeneous, and changes are also under way with 
respect to the public regulation as to the industry structure. Even if not intensely observed by 
the specialists of the industrialized countries, there is in intense interchange of experiences 
between the countries, giving rise to consultancy contracts for the firms of the countries which 
may deliver best practices (Brazil, more recently Columbia and Chile). Within this context of 
change, regulatory issues have been given priority. 
 
Where the artisan production is still dominant, the single operators organize themselves in co-
operatives, which manage the lines. In Peru and Columbia, some formal enterprises are also 
present as intermediary between the (subcontracted) single vehicle owners and the authorities.  
 
As mentioned before, traffic congestion have led to some reactions by the authorities, which 
have tried to put in place concentration strategies, mostly requiring the acquisition of bigger 
vehicles and the organization of the operators into enterprises. In several countries this 
attempt has provoked resistance by the operators and has been blocked, as it could lead to a 
severe social commotion. Even the introduction of a modern metro system, which has been 
rather an exception on the grounds of the high costs, has not led automatically to a market 
change. In Caracas, the metro enterprise has so far not been able to subcontract a major 
operator for feeder services, and these are still now executed by single operators. A major 
system rationalization project for the La Paz  municipality (Bolivia) has not been put in place. 
In Columbia, where as Medellin has already a metro system, the capital city Bogotá has not 
introduced one.  
 
In general, it may be concluded that attempts by the governments to give rise to mature 
enterprises by means of credit or other subsidies especially to the low-income operators 
(Venezuela) have not had success.  
 
In these artisan and dispersed systems, the internal competition may be considered fierce, 
whereby the artisan operators have adopted the strategy to augment the fleet, letting them be 
operated by family members. Thus, no entry barriers are in force, since the families compete 
between themselves by multiplying freely the fleet. Major companies, especially from other 
countries, have not any incentive to enter into these markets, as the fare prices and the 
resulting profit rates are extremely low.  
 
In this situation, the service is not organized into an integrated network. The expansion of the 
services follow the new market requirements, and an excess of supply may be observed. In 
Lima, the excess of supply has led to the rotation of the operators, which are obliged to stop in 
alternate days. In La Paz, the surplus is so low that minibus operation has turned too costly, 
and common passenger cars are increasingly present in the market. 
 
Pressured by the worsening congestion and pollution conditions, some capital city 
administrations (Bogotá, Santiago, Lima and Quito) have set up either a whole network 
concept or at least a subsystem of major corridors to be modernized. In this context, the 
experience of Bogotá, as formerly that of Curitiba, has served as the benchmark and export 
model. This model implies in a broader institutional, organizational and managerial change, 
where also new control technology is introduced. A centralized and integrative fare system 
and major vehicles are introduced in a step-by-step process, with the aim that in the future it 
may embrace most of the urban area.  
 
But the generalization of this upgraded systems has its limits, as the public funds get scarce 
(even when fostered by an additional fuel tax). The resistance of the operators which remain 
outside grows also stronger as the organizational transition is not well managed, and the 
minor stakeholders are either submitted to a lower income or get ousted from the system.   
 
The institutional transition gives rise to legal complications, too, and economic losses have to 
be compensated by governmental indemnities which grow year to year. And there is also a 
need to manage the interfaces between the modern subsystem and the traditional one. The 
reaction to the changes by the traditional industry varies from open rioting resistance to the 
refusal to do under contract by the modern system. Some remaining operators may also decide 
by themselves to upgrade to modern enterprises. 
 
With respect to competition, a competitive tension comes to day between major modern 
operators, cooperatives and intermediary subcontracting enterprises. This competition occurs 
moreover on the legal and institutional battlefield, and less directly on the street. The 
government itself tries to hinder on-the street competition, especially on the modern axes, 
where he prefer to put the new, modern companies under protection. 
 
Case Studies In Hispano-America 
Treating more specifically the Colombian case, while in the seventies, eighties and nineties 
the respective motorization rates were at 20, 40 and 65 vehicles for 1000  inhabitants, in 1996 
a rate of already 150 was attained (JICA 1996). It was during the nineties that Bogotá 
perceived a rapid deterioration of the traffic and transport conditions. With respect to public 
transport, in 1995 more than 21 thousand vehicles belonging to 64 companies ran on the 
streets of Bogotá, operating 639 routes. Beyond these, 39 thousand taxis and 500 thousand 
private cars disputed the scarce road space. The 5,8 million inhabitants made 14,9 million 
daily trips, where the bus system had a share of 77,5% of the trips (Bustamante 2007). The 
resulting congestion problems were worsened by poor road maintenance, traffic management 
and sewage: in heavily rainy days, when the heavy rain, a big part of the road space was under 
water. 
 
 
60
80
100
120
140
160
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ta
xa
 d
e 
m
ot
or
iz
aç
ão
 (v
eí
cu
lo
s 
x 
1.
00
0 
ha
b.
)
 
Source: Bustamante (2007) 
Figure 1:  The evolution of the motorization rate in Bogotá 1990-2006  
(vehicles per 1000 inhabitants) 
 
 
With respect to the industry structure, it was (and is still, in the residual system outside the 
TransMilenio project) organized in a chain of intermediaries. The Local Government gave to 
the companies route permissions. These companies did not operate the permitted services 
directly but sold (leased) their right to operate the permitted routes to vehicle owners, who in 
their turn subcontracted driver and rewarded them on the basis of an agreed percentage of the 
fare box revenue. The drivers were then forced to chase the passengers on the street, offering 
a fierce competition and endangering the traffic conditions. On their turn, the companies 
pressed the Government to open up new route permissions in order to broaden their route 
leasing market, so that new vehicle owners could be attracted. The result of this was an 
oversupply of transport services, reducing the net profit of the owners (Bustamante 2007).  
 
As a reaction to this situation, new ways have been searched for during the nineties. An initial 
contracted study by JICA stressed the development of several transportation axes, without 
establishing clear directives for a public transport policy. The construction of an underground 
system was then considered as the definitive solution and put forward by President Samper, 
who was ready to dedicate special financial help to the capital, provided that the metro 
solution was adopted.  
 
In 1998, Penãlosa was elected as Mayor and tried immediately to raise the fuel tax. But his 
preference for the transit policy was a modern bus corridor, as it would be much more cost 
effective and be within the limits of the municipal resources. For political reasons, the new 
President Pestrana insisted on the metro solution, and Peñalosa accepted this condition to get 
the resources from the central government. 
 
But with part of these resources the Mayor invested in studies for a modern bus corridor 
option and began a hard struggle with the National Parliament, in order to get the 
authorization to invest the resources dedicated for the metro solution in the corridor solution. 
As Pañalosa’s mandate was already midterm, he decided to use directly the municipal 
resources for the first stage of the project, whereas the national resources would be used in the 
second stage.  
 
Peñalosa´s corridor concept was a Curitiba-like corridor, differing radically from already 
current proposals to build a corridor for the current minibus operators. For its design, 
international consultancy was contracted, but hard political struggles for the choice of the 
most appropriate routes had to be fought, as councilors tied to the minibus operators and 
associations tried to reserve the main avenues for the traditional transport service, shifting the 
new system to relatively inaccessible axes.   
 
Beyond this, the concept included broad urban renewal measures in favour of the urban poor, 
as a whole network of bikeways and walkways was integrated into the corridor concept. 
Social equipment as parks, culture and sport centres were also on the programme. 
 
The construction of the transit system and the connected social equipment has also suffered 
different interruptions due to the expropriation and transference of public infrastructure and 
equipment, which provoked hidden political resistance from incumbent officials and 
politicians. By hiring competent and energetic project managers the Mayor assured the final 
victory over these hindrances. The construction work was executed by a public corporation, 
the Institute for Urban Development. In 1998, the bus models were presented to the public, 
which provoked some negative reactions from the minibus operators, owners and route 
leasing companies.  
 
Evidently, the TransMilenio concept would imply in a major organizational change, as larger 
buses should be acquired. Initial ideas to concede the whole system to a sole operator were 
soon dropped, as the resistance of the army of small operators and of the respective 
associations and unions would be impeditive. 
 
A piece-meal convincement procedure was put into operation, and several companies and 
associations began to reorganize themselves into major operators. Nevertheless, rebellions, 
strikes and street blockades were the order of the day, as the deadline for the inauguration of 
the system neared. The conflicts worsened and some extreme-right paramilitary groups 
menaced to assassinate the leaders of the rebellious groups, which would imply in a political 
disaster for the project.  
 
More concretely, the TransMilenio should be operated in its first phase by 4 contracted 
concessionaires. Most of the traditional operators preferred to stay outside, and only three 
contracts could be assigned. In a new tender run, the fourth contracted was won by a new firm 
set up by major Colombian freight companies. But even from the three other companies, only 
one was owned in its majority by bus companies. Thus most of the traditional companies lost 
the first opportunity to participate in the new system, and the new companies surged as a new 
main actor in the public transportation industry of Bogotá, with contrary interests to the 
traditional sector. It is also worth of note that only the companies have accepted to participate 
in the new system, and the vehicle owners, albeit invited to, refused the change.  
 
Of course, the introduction of TransMilenio implied the elimination of a large lot of routes 
and the scrapping off of the correspondent vehicles. The participating concessionaries had to 
comply with a program of fleet suppression, receiving a corresponding indemnity. It was 
programmed to retire 5000 vehicles, but actually only 1550 vehicles got out of operation, and 
the remaining were transferred to the subsistent traditional sector, turning it additionally 
competitive and overcrowd. 
 
Once in operation, the overwhelming success led to the fact that the municipality celebrated, 
in 2003, an extended agreement with the National Parliament, which assured a generous 
funding line in order to build up a 388 km long network of similar bus corridors until 2016.   
Peñalosa’s successor and direct collaborator Mockus assumed in 2003, assuring the continuity 
of the TransMilenio project. His main challenge was to harmonize the rest of the industry 
which remained outside with the new network. In the year 2003, a reorganization project for 
the traditional public transport system was put in practice. The idea was to turn the permission 
holding companies directly responsible for the operation, its planning and controlling, and for 
the assumption of the involved risks. On their turn, the vehicle owners would rent their 
vehicle to the companies. On the same time, a radical fleet reduction was imposed. 
 
The 2003 Decree caused immediately negative reactions both by the companies and owners 
and was hold by the Courts. The owners refused the new dependent role in regard of the 
companies, and the companies were not technically prepared to assume the responsibilities 
foreseen by the Decree, as they have gotten habituated to sell their permission rights without 
taking any responsibility for the commercial success (the regulation until then in force obliged 
them to own at least 3% of the operating fleet, which was easy to comply with). The 
Administration tried to mitigate the modernization risks by introducing a new Service Quality 
Factor component in the fare price calculation, enabling the companies to invest in their 
modernization (training, acquisition of service and fare box revenue control equipment and 
other measures). Finally, a Supreme Court ruling of this year turned the 2003 Decree 
effective, opening up to the present Garzón Administration (2004-2008) the gates for the 
implementation of the new TransMilenio phase and the reform of the remaining traditional 
sector.  
 
Notwithstanding the resistance remains fierce. To begin with, the owners refuse to sell the 
fleet to be scrapped at the price offered by the companies, and these do not accept the price 
required by the owners. The owners are by the way the group that has suffered most the 
consequences of the change, firstly because of the reduction in patronage, and secondly 
because of the fiercer competition by the transferred fleet which has not been retired from the 
TransMilenio area. 
 
Today, the industry itself is politically divided. On the one extreme, the block which was built 
up by the TransMilenio project fears the modernization of the traditional sector, seeing it as a 
new competitive threat for the future, when the new contract areas of TransMilenio are 
progressively put to bid and disputed by the modernized traditional sector. The traditional 
sector itself is split in to a group that reacts positively to the reforms and accepts to comply 
with the new rules, albeit the organizational challenges and inherent difficulties. The other 
sector tries still to resist. 
 
Still in 2006 (that is, after the reorganization project), Bogotá counted 66 companies, which 
detained 517 route permissions. Half of them may be classified as small companies (an 
average of three route permissions per company, operated by an average of 200 vehicles), 
which in its total occupy 2700 vehicles (13% of the total fleet). On the other extreme, 12 
major companies own an average of 18 routes and operate with a total 9734 vehicles, 
representing 50% of the total fleet. Between the two groups, 35% of the companies have 
under their control an average of 200 to 500 vehicles, totaling 7320 vehicles (37% of the total 
fleet; see Table 1)  
 
 
Table 1:  Industry concentration in the traditional bus sector of Bogotá  
 
Group Fleet Companies % Vehicles % Average Fleet  
Average 
no. of 
routes  
1 - 100 19 28,7 % 1.102 5,5 % A 
101 - 200 12 18,1 % 1.606 8,1 % 
87 3,0 
201 - 300 12 18,1 % 2.926 14,8 % B 
301 - 500 11 16,6 % 4.394 22,2 % 
318 8,5 
501 - 700 6 9,0 % 3.671 18,5 % 
701 - 1000 4 6,0 % 3.513 17,7 % C 
1001 - 1400 2 3,0 % 2.550 12,9 % 
811 18,3 
  Totals: 66 100,0% 19.762 100,0 %     
          (Source: Bustamante 2007) 
 
With respect to the vehicle owners, this supply chain segment is dominated by small 
investors: 76% of them own one single vehicle, and other 15,5% own two vehicles.. The total 
fleet counts ca. 20 thousand vehicles, but 15,550 belong to natural persons, and the rest to 
companies. By law, the route leasing companies are obliged to own at least 3% of the 
vehicles, and in the rule they stick to this minimum. 
 
Coming now to the Chilean case, also here the deterioration of the public transport system and 
the explosive growth of private transport changed the growth dynamics of the cities and their 
morphology. It is worth to point out that Chile has pursued an active deregulation policy, 
influenced by the liberal ideologies of the eighties. While worsening radically the traffic 
conditions, this strategy was not at all able to stop the enormous rise of private transport, 
whose participation rate grew from 18,5% in 1991 to 42% in 2001 (Malbrán and Schwarz 
2006; see also Geschwender 2005).   
 
The deregulation policy itself implicated into a loss of control over the public transport 
system, as the attributions were split into several authorities, and any public planning was 
consequently impaired. Moreover, the deregulation did not lead to effective competition, as in 
result of the absence of a strong authority, the operators and their organizations took actual 
power over the network planning and were also able to impose high fare prices (Thomson 
2001). This capture did not lead to any concentration, as 30% of the fleet were directly driven 
by their owners, and other 66% of the fleet were split into a huge amount of operators 
possessing no more than 4 vehicles. The social conditions in the system were poor, as the 
drivers were rewarded on the revenues on the top of a very low basic wage and subject to 
strong revenue fluctuations. This led to the typical dodgy behaviour on the streets, were the 
drivers were forced to chase after the passengers (ibid.). 
 
As a response to the chaos, regulation was step-by-step reintroduced, initially by tendering 
procedures for the routes crossing the city of Santiago, then by subcontracting the single 
drivers. This first step reduced the number of routes to 387, but even then the average size of 
the companies resulted very small, and operational integration with the metro was still not on 
the order of the day (Gschwender 2005).  
 
A further step was the design of a completely new bus system, composed in three 
complementary networks (metro, main bus routes and feeder/local bus routes), to be run by a 
modern fleet which should include low floor and articulated buses. This system implied for 
the Government high investments of over 200 mi. Euros for the construction of segregated 
busways, of a set of 37 transfer terminals, for further improvements at 5,000 bus stops and for 
general surface and geometrical improvements along 63 km of streets and thoroughfares. 
Other modernizing features were a centrally controlled ticketing system, managed by 
especially a subcontracted information manager and a finance administrator (two separated 
contracts).  
 
The industry structure was also to be reformed, and a stark concentration of the former quasi-
artisan industry was proposed: The whole system should be subdivided into 15 bid areas (5 
areas for the main bus route system, and 10 areas for the local/feeder subsystem), which 
implied that the companies should own each an average of 500 vehicles in the main route 
system and 200 vehicles in the feeder/local system (ibid).  
 
Beyond this immense organizational challenge the economic challenges, too, were high, as 
the fare prices should be set by bids and should not be subsidized; even regular adjustments 
were not foreseen, although new operational costs would be incurred (e.g. the acquisition of 
the new ticketing automats, the revenue loss subsequently to the introduction of transfer rights 
for the passengers). It was expected that a better match between the demand and the supply 
and a reduction of the operational costs per km would ensure a compensating rise in 
patronage.  At most some minimum revenue guarantees and initial adaptive readjustments as 
well the adjustment of the contract period were admitted for the case that the foreseen demand 
levels are not attained (ibid). 
 
The initial problems of this system and the severe political consequences have gone through 
the press around the globe, and a special key paper by an insider is foreseen in the Thredbo 10 
Program. The press lists as main critical factors for the debacle:  
 
• the radical redesign of the whole network has introduced mandatory transfers for 
an immense number of passengers habituated to direct routes between their origin 
and destination; although no additional fare shall be paid, the transfer implies in 
significant time loss and inconvenience for the passengers; 
• the new network implies longer access distances and longer waiting times at the 
stops; 
• the necessary fleet was underdimensioned for the real needs, leading to higher 
waiting times and overcrowding of the vehicles; 
• the fleet was not delivered on time by the Brazilian manufactures; 
• some suspicions on hidden sabotages by the operators who dislike the new 
regulation were also reported. In fact, the introduction of the integrated fare 
system without adjusting the new fare to the fact that the overall patronage has 
been deflated has produced rising deficits mostly to the main corridors (and less to 
the feeder lines). 
 
It shall not be forgotten that the older regime, albeit its negative impacts on congestion and 
pollution and even on service quality, at least assured easy access to the stops, direct services 
and high frequencies to the users, to which they got habituated to. Thus the cultural change of 
the users should be one of the most important preoccupations for the whole project 
management; as reported by the press, the opportunities for participation in the design of the 
new network were poor.  
 
Further point: the Santiago case is not the first one where a radically redesigned network 
imposed by technocrats has provoked troubles for the mass of the users, which in the rule 
have lower income. Shocks similar to the Transantiago case have been observed in Brazilian 
cities (e.g. Belo Horizonte, Florianópolis) Especially if the affected population is not 
sufficiently involved, consulted or even informed of the changes, transition risks may be high!  
 
In Argentina, the co-operatives have transformed themselves along decades into formal 
capitalist enterprises, whereby this process has been supported by Government, which has 
pursued an active competitive strategy. (Gutiérrez 2000) It is worth of remarking that the new 
regulatory regimen introduced by the Decree no. 656/94 has been called as deregulation 
strategy, although it aimed actively to concentrate the industry and introduced actually 
franchise contracts. Main features of this reform were (ibid.): 
 
• least requirements with respect to fleet and financial capacity; 
• the permissions were given to the current operators without any tendering 
procedure; 
• permission period was given for 10 years; 
• the operating companies were permitted to fusion together, but permissions were 
given also to single persons and cooperatives;  
• the permissions were transferable 
• the existing route network remained untouched. 
 
It is worth of a note that the interurban coach transport was also deregulated, but here the 
industry has concentrated: whereas the number of companies has been reduced at 18% (basis 
year: 1982) between 1982 and 1997, for the same period the total fleet has been augmented at 
18% (Gutierrez 1998), and the number or routes increased 10% (Gutierrez 2000).  
But the same author recognizes that:   
 
• the total public transport patronage has reduced in favour of the private car and 
pedestrians;  
• on the other hand, the rail services have their receipt reduced;  
• the regulatory reform was not a result of an explicit policy in favour of public 
transport but produced by a not really transparent agreement;  
• current routes were redistributed between the incumbents, the market remaining 
closed for newcomers;  
• the incentives for re-organization of the operators aimed to resolve conflicts, 
permitting the medium-size operators to survive and, on the other hand, the major 
operators to capture the markets abandoned by the broken firms, whose 
permissions were bought; 
• the Authority did not deliver any network planning; 
• in general their regulatory empowerment became weaker; 
• a managerial modernization of the operators could be observed;  in order to foster 
scale and network economies, each operator tried to augment its network, but also 
to dominate zones;  
• no opportunity was given to the users to participate; 
• today, the presence of huge enterprises is a characteristic mark of the industry: the 
largest company operates 1300 vehicles (13% of the total fleet), followed by the 
second, which operates nearly 500 vehicles (Gutierrez 2006). 
 
In Peru, an active deregulation policy introduced in 1990 opened up the transport industry 
radically, substituting a regulated system run by an important state company (ENATRU), but 
challenged by a lot of artisan competitors. The new policy during the nineties led to 
privatization and deregulation, which was additionally facilitated by lifting of import ban and 
by the massive layoff of public sector drivers.  
 
The results of this may be seen as well in other Latin American cities: the dispersion of the 
industry (1,25 vehicles per owner), plus an increasing number of taxi and moto-taxi (190,000 
and 45,000 respectively!) offering line services informally and the high congestion and 
pollution levels in the city. This all was followed by an increase of the number of private cars, 
from 270,000 in the eighties to about one million in 2002. At the same time, the number of 
public transport vehicles has increased from 10,500 units to over 60,000 units with an average 
age of 16 years - many exceeding 25 years –making Lima's public transport fleet the oldest in 
Latin America accordingly to World Bank reports. On the other side, the participation of 
public transport in the urban transport market fell 10%; about one third of total daily trips is 
now made on foot, primarily by the poor.  
 
At the brighter side, access distance and waiting times reduced substantially, and more than 
80% of the passengers reached their final destination without transferring; also, peripheral 
slums became also accessible by line transport.  
 
But these positive results for the poor population are counterbalanced by the fact that US$500 
million are lost every year in man-hours and operational costs due to congestion and 
inefficiencies of the urban transport system, accordingly to World Bank studies. Beyond this, 
average travel times are high because of congestion, forcing the poor urban worker too spend 
of the between 1.5 to three hours a day in the buses. In addition, the quality of the services 
provided is low as vehicles are in general poorly maintained and drivers poorly trained. 
Woman and disabled are the principal victims of this, as personal safety and access conditions 
to buses are poor. Where the small operators and their associations succeed to collude, the 
fare prices are not competitive but high, worsening the economic situation of the poor urban 
commuters who are concentrated on the periphery of Lima metropolitan area. 
 
The congestion and environmental costs of this system led to the kind of reform that is turning 
into a new standard WB-receipt after a decade of preaching and fostering deregulation: the re-
strengthening of the institutional framework, which in the Lima case is split into a huge 
number of authorities: The Municipal Directorate for Urban Transport (DMTU), the 
Metropolitan Investment Fund (INVERMET), the Municipal Enterprise for the Management 
of Lima highways tolls (EMAPE), the Metropolitan Planning Institute (IMP), as well the 
Autonomous Authority for the Electric Mass Transport System (AATE).  
 
In substitution to the deregulation policy a new regulatory framework comes to the 
foreground, foreseeing  prioritization measures for public transport as the introduction of 
feeder-trunk route system and tariff structure, the introduction of new bus technologies, the 
re-introduction of public transport regulation including the imposition of professional 
standards, technical and environmental admission criteria for public transport vehicles and 
inspections and the containment of informal transport services.  
 
The crown of the reform will be again the construction of 28.6 km of segregated high-
capacity busways, built along existing road corridors in order to spare expensive land 
acquisition.  Beyond this, the program foresees the construction of terminals and general 
restoration of feeder roads in a length of  50 km (incl. the construction of bikeways). While 
the physical infrastructure has been financed by the municipality on the grounds of World 
Bank loans (approved in 2003), private concessionaires should finance the buses and bus 
maintenance equipment. Once again, the fare collection system should be concessioned and 
operated privately, on the grounds of an integrated fare collection system for the busway and 
feeder services. Displaced bus operators should be compensated by a Credit Guarantee Fund 
(The World Bank  2007: Lima Urban Transport Project; http://web.worldbank.org) 
 
Today, the implementation of the project is in charge of a new Authority, the Instituto 
Metropolitano Protransporte de Lima – Protransporte. Beyond the construction of the foreseen 
high-capacity busways (however, the definitive network differs from that initially approved), 
a rail line is also considered1, as well the construction of new terminals for intercity services. 
Together with the Municipal Agency for Urban Transport (GTU – Gerencia de Transporte 
Urbano), the Urban Rail Authority (Autoridade Autónoma del Trén Eltétrico – AATE), the 
Metropolitan Planning Institute (Instituto Metropolitano de Planificación – IMP) und the Toll 
Road Company (Empresa Administradora de Peajes de Lima – EMAPE) it forms the 
Metropolitan Committee for Transport (Comité de Transporte Metropolitano de Lima – 
TRANSMET), which  tries to ensure a co-ordination in the overall transport system in the 
Peruvian capital city. 
 
Equador´s efforts to modernize its public transport system has produced since the nineties the 
introduction of three trolley corridors, which are operated by a public corporation. A feeder 
system composed of larger buses (ECOVIAS) is under concept and shall be run by private 
enterprises. Another public corporation, the Empresa Metropolitana de Servicios y 
Administración del Transporte – EMSAT acts as planning and regulatory agency. 
 
The situation of La Paz, Bolivia, has been largerly described by Aragao and Witter (2005). 
The huge amount of single minibus owner and operators and even passenger car operators 
dominates the scene.  
 
Things in Venezuela remain unchanged: the Metro system owned by a public corporation runs 
alone, supported by some feeder lines, isolated from the dispersed minibus system. The 
Fontur (Urban Transportation Fund) acts basically as a financing agency for vehicle 
acquisition. As learnt from personal interviews with local officials, ideas about corridor 
systems similar to those being introduced in the above mentioned South America capital cities 
                                                 
1 This rail line had been planned and actually constructed by the national Government in the late 1980s, but subsequently closed because 
of insufficient patronage. 2001 the rail line was transferred to the Municipal Government, whose plan was to implement a multimodal 
system composed of the rail line and high-grade feeder bus services. This plan revealed to be not economically feasible and was 
discarded. After the Lima Transport Project has been agreed, the rail project has resurged. 
are being discussed, and also regular meetings between the metro operator, the State rail 
operator (Instituto Autónomo de Ferrocarriles del Estado – IAFE) and FONTUR are 
organized. A Mobility Study for the Metropolitan Region of Caracas is under way, but the 
difficulty is that Caracas as a urban concentration is not ruled by a centralized Administration 
but is split is different borough governments. 
 
Further North, another country which is worth to be analyzed separately is Costa Rica, where 
a formal capitalist transport industry has been developed, although the size of the operators is 
not as big as in Brazil (Contreras-Montoya 2000). In San Jose, public transport is strongly 
regulated, as the Authority determines routes and fare prices and controls the operation, which 
is executed by 47 permission holding public corporations with 1038 bus vehicles, along 130 
routes. No public operator exists since 1980. Other 15 firms operate minibus services.  
 
The Brazilian case 
The bus industry has a common root with the industries of the neighbour countries: during the 
fifties, a huge amount of artisanal minibus operators challenged the incumbent private or 
public operators and succeeded to impose themselves as the main public transport operators in 
the cities. But differently to the other countries, the Brazilian authorities reacted soon in a way 
to impose a concentration policy, obliging the newcomers to run with a fleet of big buses. The 
setup of a new domestic manufacturing industry may have facilitated that change, which 
enabled the authorities to regain control over the operation and also to produce efficiency 
gains.  
 
Over the decades, the operator groups which got increasingly concentrated  grew in influence 
in politics, funding elections and they were also able to influence the public transport policies 
and the respective regulation. It may be worth to research the role they had in impeding that 
the two major cities São Paulo and Rio set up a major metro network, which is in place in 
Mexico City.  
 
During the first oil crisis, the Federal Government set up a strong urban public transport 
policy, which financed the two metro systems, but also modernized the bus systems and their 
management (the TRANSCOL program packages included in the rule corridor investments, 
set up of standards for the buses, diffused planning, management and fare price calculation 
methodologies, introduced mandatory fare price subsidies to be paid by the employers, etc.) 
This all gave additional support to the operators and their organization, which end of the 
eighties founded their national syndicate NTU (Associação Nacional de Empresas de 
Transporte Urbanos). Organized now on national level, the major operating groups were able 
to interfere even stronger into the policies and regulation, blocking competitive pressures and 
policies, especially tendering procedures. The concentration got now a national dimension, 
and different groups began to acquire or to set up companies in several cities and even abroad 
(e.g. in Africa).   
 
In the municipalities and metropolitan regions where a strong authority could be organized 
and maintained over the years, the service network and quality developed, but the increasingly 
collaborative relation with the operators  hindered to put in place really competitive tendering 
procedures, albeit they were legally  mandatory (tendering procedures, where and when they 
were organized, were provoked by Court decisions, but the procedures were not able to alter 
substantially the industry structure). Moreover, the regulation became increasingly protective, 
transferring cost risks to the fare price, and even the enforcing of rules in regard of fleet and 
operation became weary.  
 
In the cities which were not able to put in practice a minimal empowerment for the authorities 
(e.g. Rio de Janeiro), the operation was basically decided by the main operators and the 
respective syndicate. All this process led to a loss of efficiency of the system, although the 
major enterprises were able to modernize their management, but the subsequent efficiency 
gain did not favour the user.   
 
São Paulo and Belo Horizonte are key examples for the few cases, where active state 
prosecutors succeeded to force the authorities to organize tendering procedure. In the São 
Paulo case, the tendering procedure went along a major reform in network and even in 
technology, whereby new modern corridors were introduced. In this city, the Municipal 
Government, which organizes the municipal bus network, and the State Government, who 
controls the rail service and the metropolitan bus network, never have established a common 
transit policy, even in periods where both of public bodies were ruled by politicians of the 
same party. 
 
The tendering procedure organized by the municipality selected the operators by the 
minimum reward. The municipal territory has been subdivided in operation basins, and for 
each basin a maximal fare price has been calculated on the basis of the present value of the 
respective costs during the contract life divided by the foreseen patronage (Vaz 2004). 
Actually, the operators organized themselves that only one competed effectively for each of 
the areas put to bid. And even this non competitive tendering procedure has only succeeded 
after long negotiations with the operators, who boycotted the first round of bids. 
 
But the major novelty in the São Paulo procedure was the admittance of autonomous 
operators, who were expected to be organized in cooperatives; for each operation area these 
were selected by the “best technique”, which meant the largest number of operators. So the 
cooperative who succeeded in gather the largest number of member for an area won the 
respective permission. It is worth of remark that the selection was not by the largest number 
of vehicles: that experience had been made in the 1992 tendering procedure for minibus 
services, and as result the cooperatives then committed themselves to acquire large fleet, 
which did not occur afterwards. In the 2003 tendering procedure, the experience of the 
operators gathered in the cooperatives in each local was the actual selection criterion. 
Although each operator should not own more than one vehicle, the operator was not expected 
to drive the vehicle. The tendering procedure adopted for the autonomous operators can not be 
considered as competitive, either. For each operation area, only one cooperative offered a bid. 
 
As a result of the general nationwide institutional deadlock, fare prices began to rise above the 
inflation rate, forcing the captive users to reduce their mobility or to opt for non-motorized 
transport. The patronage began to fall substantially also in a subsequent rise of motorization, 
which benefited now the lower middle-class. And a third reaction came in the form of the rise 
of the informal sector.  
 
At the beginning, the informal service, also called “alternative transport”, was welcomed by 
the user and even by some authority which had them as an important ally against the bus 
oligopoly. If the alternative transport could not be legally accepted, at least the authorities 
closed their eyes, albeit the big pressure of the bus firms to repress it.  
 
But again, the consequences for the free flow of the automobile forced some reaction by the 
authorities, pressured by the public opinion of the press which reflected the interests of the 
middle class and the commerce. The “alternatives” themselves may also be blamed for this 
reaction, as they increasingly dominated the central streets and endangered the other vehicles 
in their aggressive hunt for passengers. Their passengers, too, were increasingly forced to 
accept dangerous and uncomfortable trip conditions (overcrowded minibuses, hazardous 
driving, etc.)  It is worth of note that the bus operators, albeit financially and politically 
strong, could never gain popularity nor support by these opinion leaders! 
 
Subsequently, some local authorities began to repress the “alternatives” by different means. In 
principle, a “legalization” process was put in place, whereby the operators had to undergo a 
tendering procedure, which reduced substantially the number of admitted operators. Also, in 
some cities, these operators were obliged to acquire bigger minibuses. Moreover, the admitted 
lines were outside the city, thus restricted to areas with a thin market. This was prone to 
produce a starving process of the alternative in different phases: the immediate barrier of the 
tendering procedures and its admission requirements let the majority outside the system. In a 
subsequent phase, the surviving admitted operators began to retire, either forced by the not 
favourable market conditions, or simply by the lack of managerial competence. In several 
cases, the obtained permissions were sold to the bus operators. 
 
A classic “push-out” legalization process was put in practice in Recife in the year 2003. 
Before the procedure, 1210 vehicles operated 35 lines and competed with the official bus 
system in the core areas of the city.  In 2003, the Municipal Law no. 16856 created the 
Complementary Passenger Transport System, which admitted vehicles between 12 and 20 
seats. The foreseen routes for the system should feed the bus lines and also run tangential 
routes. In the whole, 26 lines have been established, and 252 vehicles were admitted.  
 
As anticipated, this regulation actually impaired the formerly artisan operators to succeed, and 
presently only 84 vehicles continue to operate along 11 lines, each serving a mean value of 
250 passengers per day, mainly in the northern outskirts of the city (Ferreira, Brasileiro and 
Orrico Filho 2005). 
 
In Goiânia, the capital city of the Goiás State, the alternativos were formerly well organized in 
a unique syndicate, which centralized the network planning and established service standards. 
They succeed in challenge the official bus network and then to impose their legalization. 
However, the resulting process did not recognize any power to the syndicate to organize the 
service in a modern entrepreneurial manner.  Moreover, the permission were given 
individually to each operator which was organized in smaller cooperatives, but these were not 
able to sustain the former service quality. The resulting 740 cooperatives were expected to 
operate single lines and lost the overall information on the network and the market. The 
cooperatives had no modern management and were soon to indebted, and most of the 
operators was forced to change the business.  Only 67% of the line cooperatives succeeded to 
modernize their management, to control effectively their operation and to deliver a 
satisfactory quality (Ribeiro, Orrico Filho, Barboza and Santos 2005). 
 
In other cities, the legalized “alternativos” were forced to go under contract to bus operators, 
executing for them feeder services and being rewarded by the run kilometer (Ribeirão Preto 
model).  
 
It shall be stress that all initiative to repress the “alternativos” has been undertaken without 
any effort to ask the users for their opinion. Albeit uncomfortable and dangerous, this kind of 
service remains very popular especially within the poorest population, as it serves thin 
markets and supplies a strong service frequency. The waiting times on the bus stops, where 
any information on the service is absent, has been always the major torture for the bus users! 
 
But the wave of the “alternativos” is still far from be over. The number of cities were the 
authority are weak or actually absent is overwhelming, and the bus operators are not able any 
more to monopolize the power. The “alternativos”, too, are increasingly aware of their 
popularity and influence, and may also gain support from municipal councillors. Their market 
presence is also increasing in the regional and inter-city transport.  On the dark side, as they 
remain outside the legal framework, they may be increasingly controlled by the organized 
crime.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: PERSPECTIVES FOR CHANGE 
The present contribution aims to point out the present trends of the urban public transport in 
South America, mainly in the principal metropolitan areas. Two different scenarios have been 
stated, one for Hispanic America, where the disperse artisan minibus service has been 
dominant, and the other for Brazil, where a concentrated industry operating bigger buses is 
the main feature. Even where they exist, rail services may play an important, but still 
secondary role in South America. However, this is a scene which has local variants and, 
recently, is also subject to changes. 
 
The dispersed and overly deregulated industry in Hispanic America has produced a large, 
unplanned network of almost door-do-door and frequent services between the most diverse 
parts of the metropolitan areas, even of the peripheral suburbs, but has implied in heavy 
congestion and pollution. These consequences affect all social classes and the urban economy 
in its whole, but it may be said that public transport is only then put into the government 
agenda when its affects the mobility of the user of individual transport. 
 
The measures taken opt in the rule for the introduction of new systems based on rail or, what 
is more frequent nowadays, on articulated trunk and feeder networks operated by larger buses 
owned by a more concentrated industry. The Bogotá model, captained by modern bus 
corridors with a central operational and an integrated tariff system, the operation of which is 
delegated to major companies, has served as a new paradigm, which is being copied by other 
metropolitan areas. It has been also adopted as the favourite strategy by the main multilateral 
agencies as the World Bank and the Inter-american Development Bank, which in former 
times have openly supported deregulation for the public transport industry in developing 
countries. 
 
The major challenge resides, however, in the ability of the Administration to force the huge 
dispersed industry and their politically strong stakeholders to accept the new industry 
structure, whereby a radical cut in the size of the fleet is always a central aim of the reform. In 
an industry dominated by owners of single vehicles this is considered as an existential threat 
for an important social group and provokes in the rule a fierce resistance, even if indemnities 
are foreseen by special funds.  
 
As it is almost impossible for the new systems to cover all the metropolitan area in the same 
leap, even if bus corridors are cheaper to build than rail systems, the public transport system 
will be for a long time split in two separate systems which will have an inimical relationship. 
The modern system and its stakeholders trend to advance over the territory of the traditional 
system, and this reacts in different ways: it may try to modernize itself independently from 
any support of the authorities (Gómez s.d., Celis s.d.) or to gather political support from 
opponent parties and governments which succeed to the reformers. 
 
Santiago, which has already succeeded in a prior reform to concentrate the formerly dispersed 
and deregulated industry, has tried to introduce in one single leap a totally new network 
composed of corridors, of articulated feeder lines and integrated to the already existing metro 
system with its five lines. This implies an enormous organizational challenge and may lead to 
disaster when the whole project management is faulty. The proper preparation and intense 
participation of the population is also a central success factor, especially when an immense 
network of direct links is substituted over night by an economically more efficient network, 
but which forces the users to accept vehicle transfers on their route. 
 
The situation in Brazil is quite different. For historical reasons, the industry has succeeded to 
concentrate along the decades but also to capture the authorities and their regulation. Even if 
this system has not provoked the congestion costs which are common in the metropolitan 
areas of the neighbour countries, it has produced market and production inefficiencies which 
reflect in fare price rises and in rigid networks with dominantly radial lines. Worst of all, the 
oligarchy has succeeded to resist to any reform which could threaten its dominancy, 
especially to tendering procedures, even if these are foreseen by the legislation. On the other 
side, the authorities, both national and local, have not put public transport into their agenda 
priorities, as it have been more concerned with the mobility conditions for the individual 
transport. 
 
This deadlock situation has provoked a general deterioration of the services and the 
augmentation of the fare prices; in the sequence, the poorest users have been deprived of 
mobility, losing employment chances and leisure opportunities and being forced to undertake 
long walks for their workplaces. The rise of informal transport has gained support of these 
social groups, albeit their operation conditions are similar to their Hispanic American 
coletivos. As long they do not provoke heavy congestions and deteriorate the traffic 
conditions for the individual transport, they are tolerated by the authorities, despite of the 
protests of the established operators. But when commerce and the middle class (and the their 
interests reflecting press) begin to be annoyed by the congestion and reckless driving of the 
informal operators, the authorities react by “legalizing” the system in a way that leads actually 
to its death, as the number of authorized fleet is radically reduced to few hundreds, and 
commercially non-feasible services and more expensive vehicle models are imposed. At the 
end, the incumbent bus operators give the death kiss by buying the route permissions of the 
insolvent “legalized” minibus operators. 
 
As reforms attempts have been blocked and the competitive threat of the alternativos is being 
progressively damped, which alternatives remain to regain efficiency and quality in the 
Brazilian public transport industry? Trust building in the context of  integrated trunk-feeder 
networks and fare systems has been the favourite approach by the local authorities. Even if 
State prosecutors succeed to impose the legally prescribed tendering procedures, these are not 
actually competitive, as an unwritten but clearly perceived pact between the operators of the 
different cities reduces actual competition between them.  
 
But the trust building approach has its limits: the operational and fare box data remain in 
control of the operators, the contract conditions shift the main economic risks to the user, 
leading to successive fare price rises above the inflation rate; important innovations as 
disabled-friendly vehicles (low-floor buses or elevator-equipped vehicles) are introduced too 
scarcely; and information for the user remain inexistent. In the result, public transport remains 
a domain for captive user and is not able to deliver an alternative for individual transport, 
even in heavily congested cities.  
 
Next alternatives to be thought about are: 
 
• The expansion and modernization of rail services and their introduction in cities 
where they still do not exist: the international rail industry is already courting 
Brazilian local governments, as this country may be in near future one of the few 
developing economies which are in condition to invest in these systems. Of 
course, the rail services will be for a foreseeable time hardly able to assume a 
central role in urban mobility as it does in the metropolitan areas of Europe and 
Japan, but they may occupy central market portions, putting the bus system into 
the defensive. Overall in the World, the construction of these systems is a popular 
aim of politicians, as it gives to their administration more visibility than the 
amelioration of current bus systems (“Metro is sexy, buses are not”.). So public 
transport may finally enter into the policy agenda and new, financially and 
politically stakeholders may neutralize the force of the incumbent bus operators, 
enabling the general amelioration of public transport. 
• To open up the Brazilian public transport to international competition: By its size, 
Brazilian bus industry is already mature to support its impact. Globalization of the 
Brazilian transit market could benefit directly the Brazilian industry as it will 
obliged to adopt international quality and efficiency standards, opening on its turn 
the international market to Brazilian operators. In the sequence, Brazilian bus 
manufacturing industries will use both the foreign competitors and the Brazilian 
companies operating abroad as an opportunity to turn their products more known 
in the international market. This manufacturing industry, which already exports 
and has plants over the World, is already in the condition to supply the market 
with high-quality products, which are scarcely seen in Brazil because of the short 
sight of the internal operators’ oligarchy. On its turn, the targeted opening of 
selected industrial and service markets as land passenger transport may deliver an 
opportunity for the country to overcome deadlocks in the major trade 
liberalization talks, as it is claimed by the IC that Brazil an other leading emerging 
economies shall open up their industry and service markets in change for broader 
access of their exports into the IC markets. 
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